Reported via secalert:

        There is an algorithmic complexity weakness in the way the MCS
translation daemon handles ranges of compartments in sensitivity labels.
When translating a security context that includes a range of categories
separated by a period, e.g. "c0.c10", the daemon calls the
substitute_range() function to replace the range with an explicit
declaration of each category, e.g. "c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7,c8,c9,10".
The vulnerable logic in this function is shown below (with some lines
wrapped for readability):

        while (tok) {
                if ((r=strchr(tok, '.')) !=0) {
                        int begin=atoi(&tok[1]);
                        ++r;
                        int end=atoi(&r[1]);
                        for (;begin<end+1;begin++) {
                                tmp=sub;
                                if (asprintf(&sub, "%sc%d,", sub, begin) 
                            < 0) {
                                        error=1;
                                        break;
                                }
                                free(tmp);
                        }
                } else {
                        tmp=sub;
                        if (asprintf(&sub, "%s%s,", sub, tok) < 0) {
                                error=1;
                                break;
                        }
                        free(tmp);
                }
                tok=strtok_r(NULL, ",", &ptr);
        }

The attacker supplies the input string for this function, and the values
of 'begin' and 'end' are not checked. Consequently, by supplying an
abnormally long range, an attacker can cause the program to remain in
the above loop for an extremely long period of time. Since mcstransd is
a single-threaded, single-process daemon, it supports only one
concurrent request.

        This weakness allows a local attacker to trivially prevent the daemon
from responding to requests for an extended period of time (hours or
days). When the mcstrans service is enabled, the system calls upon
mcstransd for user logins and the execution of many programs. If
mcstransd does not respond, those operations silently hang.