Red Hat Bugzilla – Bug 428274
Audit messages need distinct types
Last modified: 2010-06-28 06:31:23 EDT
Description of problem: All the audit messages related to FIPS are using audit message type AUDIT_USER which has a value of 1005. From /usr/include/linux/audit.h, the range 2400 - 2499 is reserved for user space crypto events. We need to define the types of events that NSS is reporting and change the code to use the correct audit message types preferably during F9 development.
Hi Steve, Are there any definitions for the values in that range, or are we free to pick whatever we want. Also, should we pick a single AUDIT_NSS or should we have separate entries for the various NSS AUDIT events? bob
Hi Bob, What I'd like to do is first identify the major kinds of things that have to be logged and create event types for that. So, this is something where we are more or less free to choose, but it has to be coordinated between audit and nss. Do the events fall into general categories about what is being conveyed in the audited events?
Currently all the events are rolled up under 'user events' and have the string "NSS SOFTOKEN". We log entry into the following functions: CreateObject CopyObject DestroyObject GetObjectSize GetAttributeValue SetAttributeValue CryptInit (EncryptInit/DecryptInit/SignInit/VerifyInit/VerifyRecoverInit) GenerateKey GenerateKeyPair WrapKey UnwrapKey DeriveKey DigestKey InitToken InitPin SetPin Login Logout We also log the following errors specifically: power-on-selftest failed (C_Initialize) rng test failure (C_GenerateRandom) pairwise consistancy check failed (C_GenerateKeyPair) I log 2 'severity' of events, AUDIT_INFO and AUDIT_ERROR. The 3 errors above are all AUDIT_ERROR. The logged entries are AUDIT_INFO if the operation succeeded and AUDIT_ERROR if they failed.
I think the choices we have include: 1) a single NSS_SOFTOKEN Audit category. 2) 2 softoken Audit categories (INFO and ERROR). 3) break the NSS functions into categories and provide audit categories for each of those general NSS categories (PIN, Key, Operation, management)* 4) provide audit categories for each of the entry points. I would be inclined towards options 1 or 2, possibly 3. (* these categories, I just made up in the last 30 seconds so they are for examples only, not necessarily the categories we would use).
I have a feeling that auditing all those functions is not necessary - unless you have a way of letting the crypto officer set the level of audit detail by some config parameter. But, you do have some things like: power-on-self-test, rng-test, & maybe pairwise consistency check depending on what that is. Things I'm looking at are like: changing any critical parameter of the crypto system like selection of algorithm or key length by the crypto officer, replay detection, log in to crypto officer role, key creation/distribution/handling/negotiation, failure decrypting/encrypting/hashing/signature. There might be a couple others.
Changing version to '9' as part of upcoming Fedora 9 GA. More information and reason for this action is here: http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/BugZappers/HouseKeeping
Moving this back to rawhide since the problem is still there. We still need to come to a consensus as to what types are needed. The types should reflect the major events that are called out in MLOSPP or FIPS-140. Each major event should should have 1 audit record with all details in it. It should not be at a function call trace level of detail. Events I'm considering are something like: CRYPTO_TEST, CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE, CRYPTO_REPLAY, CRYPTO_LOGIN, CRYPTO_LOGOUT, CRYPTO_KEY, and CRYPTO_FAILURE. Would there be anything that does not fit into these? Thanks.
I can live with those. For FIPS reasons we need to log each and every entry into the module that can muck with a CSP. Most have to deal with keys, so I can map CreateObject CopyObject DestroyObject GetObjectSize GetAttributeValue CryptInit (EncryptInit/DecryptInit/SignInit/VerifyInit/VerifyRecoverInit) GenerateKey GenerateKeyPair WrapKey UnwrapKey DeriveKey DigestKey To CRYPTO_KEY (Not all these operations necessarily deal with keys, but only the key versions are logged). SetAttributeValue To CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE or CRYPTO_KEY InitToken InitPin SetPin To CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE Login to CRYPTO_LOGIN Logout to CRYPTO_LOGIN power-on-selftest failed (C_Initialize) rng test failure (C_GenerateRandom) pairwise consistancy check failed (C_GenerateKeyPair) Probably map to CRYPTO_FAILURE. They could also map as follows power-on-selftest fail CRYPTO_TEST, type=ERROR rng test failure CRYPTO_TEST or CRYPTO_FAIL type=ERROR pairwise consistancy check failed CRYPTO_KEY type=ERROR bob
OK, I agree with the mapping of CRYPTO_KEY, but what we should do is have a field op=xxx that describes what is happening at at higher level. IOW, creation,destruction,negotiation,etc. CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE would be intended for setting a key size, setting preferred algorithms, etc. It should have both the old and new value. So, mapping SetAttributeValue to it is likely the right thing. The next set, InitTokem through SetPin probably all don't map to the same one. If they are involved in key creation, then CRYPTO_KEY is probably the right choice. Login/out would map to CRYPTO_LOGIN with perhaps an op=xxx field giving one word, in or out to distinguish the two. The tests would map to CRYPTO_TESTS with the res field showing 1 success and 0 failure. CRYPTO_FAILURE would be used whenever there was a failure in decrypting, encrypting, hashing, signing, or the randomization process. These categories are derived from Table 5.2 of the Medium Robustness Protection Profile (PP_OS_ML_MR2.0_V1.91.pdf), page 42 & 44. Note that MR encompasses FIPS level 2 and higher and only calls out for audit in failures of certain things and all events for a small selection (changes in attributes & self tests). Hope this helps.
audit package 1.7.11-2 was built with the CRYPTO events added. Its in rawhide and F-10.
This bug appears to have been reported against 'rawhide' during the Fedora 11 development cycle. Changing version to '11'. More information and reason for this action is here: http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/BugZappers/HouseKeeping
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Fedora 11 changed to end-of-life (EOL) status on 2010-06-25. Fedora 11 is no longer maintained, which means that it will not receive any further security or bug fix updates. As a result we are closing this bug. If you can reproduce this bug against a currently maintained version of Fedora please feel free to reopen this bug against that version. Thank you for reporting this bug and we are sorry it could not be fixed.