Bug 509990 - Review Request: openssh-blacklist - Fingerprints of the keys affected by CVE-2008-0166
Summary: Review Request: openssh-blacklist - Fingerprints of the keys affected by CVE-...
Keywords:
Status: CLOSED RAWHIDE
Alias: None
Product: Fedora
Classification: Fedora
Component: Package Review
Version: rawhide
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
medium
medium
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Stepan Kasal
QA Contact: Fedora Extras Quality Assurance
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2009-07-07 10:07 UTC by Jan F. Chadima
Modified: 2021-12-31 15:55 UTC (History)
11 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
Doc Type: Bug Fix
Doc Text:
Clone Of:
Environment:
Last Closed: 2010-03-05 15:46:32 UTC
Type: ---
Embargoed:
xjakub: fedora-review+
j: fedora-cvs+


Attachments (Terms of Use)

Comment 1 Stepan Kasal 2009-07-07 12:36:25 UTC
FAIL no upstream
  - please put these results to your web page, perhaps to jfch.fedorapeople.org
  - create a short page for the package
  - giving back to the comunity
OK package meets naming and versioning guidelines.
OK specfile is properly named, is cleanly written and uses macros consistently.
OK dist tag is present.
OK build root is correct.
OK license field matches the actual license.
OK license is open source-compatible, license text included in package.
OK latest version is being packaged.
OK BuildRequires are proper.
OK no compiler flags
OK %clean is present.
OK package builds in mock.
OK package installs properly.
OK no debuginfo
FAIL rpmlint complains W: no URL: tag
   After creating a page for the project, please add "URL:" tag to the spec file
OK no provides nor requires
OK no %check, no test suite
OK no shared libraries are added to the regular linker search paths.
OK owns the directories it creates.
OK doesn't own any directories it shouldn't.
OK no duplicates in %files.
OK file permissions are appropriate.
OK no scriptlets present.
OK code, not content.
   -- Well, this requires a comment: the package contains data exclusively.
   The data are precomputed list of compromised keys, as created on computers
   affected by CVE-2008-0166.  The programs made to defend security cannot work
   without this list, so this package is more similar to a game level data than
   to a "content".
   (cf http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Packaging:Guidelines#Code_Vs_Content)
OK documentation is small, so no -docs subpackage is necessary.
OK %docs are not necessary for the proper functioning of the package.
OK no headers, no pkgconfig, .la, nor desktop files.

Please fix the two FAIL issues above and I'll approve the package.

Comment 2 Tomas Hoger 2009-07-07 12:43:16 UTC
What is the benefit of having this packaged in Fedora?  Do you plan to package some tool that will actually make use of them in any way?  Where do those fingerprints come from?  Can the package possibly get some better name? ;)

Comment 3 Stepan Kasal 2009-07-07 13:27:09 UTC
(In reply to comment #2)
> What is the benefit of having this packaged in Fedora?  Do you plan to package
> some tool that will actually make use of them in any way?

Yes, one or two such packages should follow soon.

> Where do those fingerprints come from?

Jan has computed big part of them, some parts of the list are downloaded from various sources.

Yes, that is something that has to be fixed: the sources should be acknowledged.

> Can the package possibly get some better name? ;)  

Do you have any idea?  ;-)
I wrote my OK when I realized I cannot come to a better name.

Comment 4 Tomas Hoger 2009-07-07 13:39:21 UTC
(In reply to comment #3)
> > What is the benefit of having this packaged in Fedora?  Do you plan to package
> > some tool that will actually make use of them in any way?
> 
> Yes, one or two such packages should follow soon.

Feel free to CC me on bugs for those.  Will that be for SSL only or SSH too?

> > Can the package possibly get some better name? ;)  
> 
> Do you have any idea?  ;-)
> I wrote my OK when I realized I cannot come to a better name.  

I had no specific suggestion in mind, Debian/Ubuntu named their packages as open(ssh|ssl|vpn)-blacklist.

Comment 5 Jan F. Chadima 2009-07-07 13:54:59 UTC
(In reply to comment #4)
> (In reply to comment #3)
> 
> Feel free to CC me on bugs for those.  Will that be for SSL only or SSH too?
this is SSH keys
> 
> 
> I had no specific suggestion in mind, Debian/Ubuntu named their packages as
> open(ssh|ssl|vpn)-blacklist.  
Debian users knows the problem, redhats, may not. I preffer have the matter of weakness mentioned in the name.

Comment 6 Tomas Hoger 2009-07-07 14:33:47 UTC
(In reply to comment #5)
> > I had no specific suggestion in mind, Debian/Ubuntu named their packages as
> > open(ssh|ssl|vpn)-blacklist.  
> Debian users knows the problem, redhats, may not. I preffer have the matter of
> weakness mentioned in the name.  

I do see some of the files seem to come from Debian openssh-blacklist packages (have identical creation dates).  Why not getting remaining key sizes included in openssh-blacklist upstream tarball and name Fedora package after it?

Comment 7 Tomas Hoger 2009-07-07 15:30:38 UTC
Also, is there any good reason why le32_rsa_8192 contains only 5083 fingerprints, rather than full space of ~2^15 keys?  It's obviously derived from the HDMoore's *incomplete* set of 8192 bit LE32 keys [1], which, if I remember correctly, was published as incomplete due to time constraints at the time of publication.

[1] http://www.metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/debian-openssl/

Comment 8 Jan F. Chadima 2009-07-08 06:46:51 UTC
> 
> I do see some of the files seem to come from Debian openssh-blacklist packages
> (have identical creation dates).  Why not getting remaining key sizes included
> in openssh-blacklist upstream tarball and name Fedora package after it?  
because the next package with full keys will follow instead of debian.


> Also, is there any good reason why le32_rsa_8192 contains only 5083
> fingerprints, rather than full space of ~2^15 keys?  It's obviously derived
> from the HDMoore's *incomplete* set of 8192 bit LE32 keys [1], which, if I
> remember correctly, was published as incomplete due to time constraints at the
> time of publication.
> 
> [1] http://www.metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/debian-openssl/ 
generating 8192 keys is extremly slow 
both 8192 keys are incomplete, the le64 I finish before release.

Comment 9 Jan F. Chadima 2009-07-20 10:56:29 UTC
I've changed name of package as propossed to openssh-blacklist, aded URL to upstream. Now the package is awailable at 

Spec URL:
http://www.benhur.prf.cuni.cz/medved-7/wydobitki/fedora/openssh-blacklist/openssh-blacklist.spec
SRPM URL:
http://www.benhur.prf.cuni.cz/medved-7/wydobitki/fedora/openssh-blacklist/openssh-blacklist-0.7-1.fc12.src.rpm

Comment 10 Matěj Cepl 2009-07-20 20:42:12 UTC
Yeah, like it.

APPROVED

Comment 11 Jan F. Chadima 2009-07-20 20:49:50 UTC
New Package CVS Request
=======================
Package Name: openssh-blacklist
Short Description: Fingerprints of the openssh keys affected by CVE-2008-0166
Owners: jfch2222
Branches: F-10 F-11 
InitialCC:

Comment 12 Milos Jakubicek 2009-07-20 21:14:43 UTC
You set fedora-review?, I guess you wanted fedora-cvs? => correcting.

Comment 13 Jason Tibbitts 2009-07-21 15:21:18 UTC
CVS done.

Comment 14 Tomas Hoger 2009-07-24 15:45:29 UTC
Uhoh... 1 gig SRPM?!  Is that intentional?  I presume source tar.gz now contains all keys, not only fingerprints.  But still, 1 gig SRPM to build 14 meg RPM...

Comment 15 Jan F. Chadima 2009-07-24 19:27:27 UTC
Not all but all generated yet (cca 1/2). I need the contributors espcially for be32 arch. The subpackage with private keys will follow in cca 2 weeks.

Comment 16 Tomas Hoger 2009-07-27 07:57:51 UTC
Do you plan to introduce some other tool besides iwak that will use those private keys?

Comment 17 Jan F. Chadima 2009-07-27 08:27:34 UTC
Yes me or one of my students want to port some of CR0 tools (http://www.cr0.org/progs/sshfun/) and maybe more.

Comment 18 Tomas Hoger 2009-07-27 08:58:20 UTC
Ok.  This still does not seem to have a very good 'required disk space on mirrors' vs. 'expected number of users of the package' ratio, but maybe it's just me.  I'd still consider splitting those private keys subpackages into one with expected keys sizes (1024, 2048, 4096) and those of size less likely to be used in the wild (1023, 2047).  Have you seen any research on most commonly used ssh key sizes?

Do you have a tool that can be given a pid range and it'll generate all keys in the range?  So the effort in generating missing keys can be split across multiple systems?

Comment 19 Yanko Kaneti 2009-07-28 07:36:46 UTC
(In reply to comment #18)
> Ok.  This still does not seem to have a very good 'required disk space on
> mirrors' vs. 'expected number of users of the package' ratio, but maybe it's
> just me.  

Its not only you.


If this ends up in the updates repos anyway (shudder) then please at least do it appropriately: no dist tag, single package/build inherited for the different supported releases.

Comment 20 Bill Nottingham 2009-07-28 15:24:18 UTC
No. If this is only packaging the fingerprints, *only ship the fingerprints in the source*. Frankly, the private/public stuff should be generated on demand if it's that much data.

Comment 21 Jan F. Chadima 2009-07-28 18:14:58 UTC
Replacement of this package will be published soon. There will be only downloader from the website.

Comment 22 Brennon Turner 2021-12-31 15:55:57 UTC
Thanks for a very interesting post. What else may I get that kind of info written in such a perfect approach? I’ve got an undertaking that I am simply now operating on, and I have been on the lookout for such info. https://krunkerio.io


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