In his upcoming Blackhat paper and presentation Dan Kaminsky
highlights some more issues he has found relating to SSL hash
collisions and related vulnerabilities.

His second issue is all about inconsistencies in the interpretation of subject x509 names in certificates.  Specifically "issue 2b, subattack 1' is where a malicious certificate can contain leading 0's in the OID.  The idea is that the attacker could add in some OID into a certificate that, when handled by the CA, would appear to be some extension and ignored, but when handled by OpenSSL would appear to be the Common Name OID.  So the attacker would present the certificate to a client application using OpenSSL and it might think that the OID is actually a Common Name, and accept the certificate where it otherwise should not.

However this turns out to not be a security issue as although OpenSSL will display the OID for a Common Name, it does not believe it to be a common name.

Steve Henson from OpenSSL explains: "OpenSSL does tolerate leading 0x80 but it does _not_ recognize this as commonName because the NID code checks for a precise match with the encoding.  Attempts to print this out will never show commonName nor will attempts to look up using NID_commonName. So it would need something really weird to misinterpret this such as something which obtains all OIDs in numeric form and does its own lookups bypassing some but not all of OpenSSL's OID library."

So OpenSSL will probably fix this as a bug fix in the future (perhaps rejecting such an invalid OID encoding)