On 26C3, Fabian Yamaguchi presented a directory traversal flaw in libpurple MSN protocol implementation. The flaw can be used by the remote attacker to download arbitrary file readable by the user running instant messenger using libpurple (such as pidgin) from the victim's computer via MSN emoticon / smiley download request. More details in Fabian's presentation: http://events.ccc.de/congress/2009/Fahrplan/events/3596.en.html http://events.ccc.de/congress/2009/Fahrplan/attachments/1483_26c3_ipv4_fuckups.pdf (slides 10-22) Upstream fix: http://d.pidgin.im/viewmtn/revision/info/c64a1adc8bda2b4aeaae1f273541afbc4f71b810 which depends on the other two commits: http://d.pidgin.im/viewmtn/revision/info/4be2df4f72bd8a55cdae7f2554b73342a497c92f http://d.pidgin.im/viewmtn/revision/info/3d02401cf232459fc80c0837d31e05fae7ae5467 References: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.oss.general/2462 Mitigations: Remove ~/.purple/custom_smiley/ directory if it exists. The directory is not created by default and is created when first custom smiley is defined.
pidgin-2.6.5-1.fc12 has been pushed to the Fedora 12 stable repository. If problems still persist, please make note of it in this bug report.
pidgin-2.6.5-1.fc11 has been pushed to the Fedora 11 stable repository. If problems still persist, please make note of it in this bug report.
This issue has been addressed in following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 Via RHSA-2010:0044 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2010-0044.html