Red Hat would like to thank George Hedfors of Cybercom Sweden East AB for reporting this issue.
(In reply to comment #0)
> It was reported that Luci's (Luci is a web based front-end component of the
> Conga cluster management system) user session timeout feature depended only
> tab without logging out of Luci session and without closing browser, they
> could re-open Luci web interface and continue using the session even after
> the timeout period has elapsed.
Further investigation of this problem uncovered additional problems in the Luci's session handling. After opening Luci session, __ac session cookie was set. The value for this cookie was not an opaque identifier for the server-side session, but it contained base64 encoded string containing user's user name and password. Therefore if an attacker was able to obtain __ac cookie value, they could authenticate to Luci as the victim regardless of any session timeouts.
Upcoming Conga update improves Luci session handling in several ways:
- user name and password is no longer stored in cookie
- session cookie value is now an opaque identifier for the server-side session
- session inactivity timeouts are enforced on the server side
This issue has been addressed in following products:
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5
Via RHSA-2013:0128 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2013-0128.html
It was discovered that luci stored usernames and passwords in session
cookies. This issue prevented the session inactivity timeout feature from
working correctly, and allowed attackers able to get access to a session
cookie to obtain the victim's authentication credentials. (CVE-2012-3359)
MITRE has split the CVEs:
- CVE-2012-3359 is for the "luci stored usernames and passwords in session
- CVE-2013-7347 is for the "session inactivity timeout feature" not working correctly