Happened while running "cobbler check" which attempts to probe selinux in some ways to suggest setting booleans. Summary: SELinux is preventing /usr/sbin/getsebool "read" access on booleans. Detailed Description: SELinux denied access requested by getsebool. It is not expected that this access is required by getsebool and this access may signal an intrusion attempt. It is also possible that the specific version or configuration of the application is causing it to require additional access. Allowing Access: You can generate a local policy module to allow this access - see FAQ (http://docs.fedoraproject.org/selinux-faq-fc5/#id2961385) Please file a bug report. Additional Information: Source Context unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 Target Context system_u:object_r:security_t:s0 Target Objects booleans [ dir ] Source getsebool Source Path /usr/sbin/getsebool Port <Unknown> Host (removed) Source RPM Packages libselinux-utils-2.0.90-5.fc13 Target RPM Packages Policy RPM selinux-policy-3.7.19-37.fc13 Selinux Enabled True Policy Type targeted Enforcing Mode Enforcing Plugin Name catchall Host Name (removed) Platform Linux (removed) 2.6.33.6-147.fc13.x86_64 #1 SMP Tue Jul 6 22:32:17 UTC 2010 x86_64 x86_64 Alert Count 1 First Seen Fri 23 Jul 2010 09:11:08 AM EDT Last Seen Fri 23 Jul 2010 09:11:08 AM EDT Local ID d5bd6fd8-fd6a-4fa3-86cf-6a4bd3ef1678 Line Numbers Raw Audit Messages node=(removed) type=AVC msg=audit(1279890668.345:29611): avc: denied { read } for pid=12827 comm="getsebool" name="booleans" dev=selinuxfs ino=19 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:security_t:s0 tclass=dir node=(removed) type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1279890668.345:29611): arch=c000003e syscall=2 success=no exit=-13 a0=7fffaa753650 a1=90800 a2=367b407f00 a3=fffffff6 items=0 ppid=5950 pid=12827 auid=500 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=12 comm="getsebool" exe="/usr/sbin/getsebool" subj=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 key=(null) Hash String generated from catchall,getsebool,cobblerd_t,security_t,dir,read audit2allow suggests: #============= cobblerd_t ============== allow cobblerd_t security_t:dir read;
cobbler should not be hard coding SELinux checks into itself. Others might write different policy decisions and cobbler can run fine with different labelling. We need to fix the labeling in the selinux policy package but do not check with the tool. If you want to check the state of booleans, (Not a great idea) you can use the selinux python bindings. import selinux def check_selinux(self,status): """ Suggests various SELinux rules changes to run Cobbler happily with SELinux in enforcing mode. FIXME: this method could use some refactoring in the future. """ enabled = (selinux.is_selinux_enabeled() == 0) if enabled: if selinux.security_get_boolean_active("httpd_can_network_connect") != 1: status.append(_("Must enable a selinux boolean to enable vital web services components, run: setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect true")) if selinux.security_get_boolean_active("rsync_disable_trans") != 1: status.append(_("Must enable the cobbler import and replicate commands, run: setsebool -P rsync_disable_trans=1")) As an example of why this is bad. rsync_disable_trans does not exist in F13 or RHEL6.
*** Bug 617574 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***
This bug is present in F14, can we get some progress on it.
This package has changed ownership in the Fedora Package Database. Reassigning to the new owner of this component.
*** Bug 668536 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***
With permissive, on RHEL 6.1, many more denials are revealed: type=AVC msg=audit(1306311352.911:513790): avc: denied { read } for pid=25462 comm="getsebool" name="booleans" dev=selinuxfs ino=21 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:security_t:s0 tclass=dir type=AVC msg=audit(1306311352.999:513791): avc: denied { create } for pid=25464 comm="semanage" scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tclass=netlink_audit_socket type=AVC msg=audit(1306311355.164:513792): avc: denied { read search } for pid=25464 comm="semanage" name="active" dev=dm-0 ino=1050988 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:semanage_store_t:s0 tclass=dir type=AVC msg=audit(1306311355.164:513793): avc: denied { read } for pid=25464 comm="semanage" name="semanage.read.LOCK" dev=dm-0 ino=787482 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:semanage_read_lock_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(1306311355.165:513794): avc: denied { write } for pid=25464 comm="semanage" name="modules" dev=dm-0 ino=1050995 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:semanage_store_t:s0 tclass=dir type=AVC msg=audit(1306311355.165:513795): avc: denied { read } for pid=25464 comm="semanage" name="policy.kern" dev=dm-0 ino=1051241 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:semanage_store_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(1306311355.165:513795): avc: denied { open } for pid=25464 comm="semanage" name="policy.kern" dev=dm-0 ino=1051241 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:semanage_store_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(1306311355.165:513796): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=25464 comm="semanage" path="/etc/selinux/targeted/modules/active/policy.kern" dev=dm-0 ino=1051241 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:semanage_store_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(1306311355.720:513797): avc: denied { search } for pid=25464 comm="semanage" name="contexts" dev=dm-0 ino=787460 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:default_context_t:s0 tclass=dir type=AVC msg=audit(1306311355.720:513797): avc: denied { search } for pid=25464 comm="semanage" name="files" dev=dm-0 ino=787466 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:file_context_t:s0 tclass=dir type=AVC msg=audit(1306311355.721:513798): avc: denied { open } for pid=25464 comm="semanage" name="semanage.read.LOCK" dev=dm-0 ino=787482 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:semanage_read_lock_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(1306311355.721:513799): avc: denied { lock } for pid=25464 comm="semanage" path="/etc/selinux/targeted/modules/semanage.read.LOCK" dev=dm-0 ino=787482 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:semanage_read_lock_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(1306311359.167:513800): avc: denied { read } for pid=25496 comm="cat" name="ip_tables_names" dev=proc ino=4026532188 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_net_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(1306311359.167:513800): avc: denied { open } for pid=25496 comm="cat" name="ip_tables_names" dev=proc ino=4026532188 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_net_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(1306311359.168:513801): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=25496 comm="cat" path="/proc/25496/net/ip_tables_names" dev=proc ino=4026532188 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_net_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(1306311359.170:513802): avc: denied { search } for pid=25487 comm="iptables" name="lock" dev=dm-0 ino=1704685 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_lock_t:s0 tclass=dir type=AVC msg=audit(1306311359.173:513803): avc: denied { create } for pid=25497 comm="iptables" scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tclass=rawip_socket type=AVC msg=audit(1306311359.173:513803): avc: denied { net_raw } for pid=25497 comm="iptables" capability=13 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tclass=capability type=AVC msg=audit(1306311359.174:513804): avc: denied { getopt } for pid=25497 comm="iptables" lport=255 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tclass=rawip_socket type=AVC msg=audit(1306311359.174:513804): avc: denied { net_admin } for pid=25497 comm="iptables" capability=12 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:cobblerd_t:s0 tclass=capability I guess we need some better way to do the cobbler check now that the daemon runs confined.
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Fedora 13 changed to end-of-life (EOL) status on 2011-06-25. Fedora 13 is no longer maintained, which means that it will not receive any further security or bug fix updates. As a result we are closing this bug. If you can reproduce this bug against a currently maintained version of Fedora please feel free to reopen this bug against that version. Thank you for reporting this bug and we are sorry it could not be fixed.