Bug 629441 (CVE-2010-3067) - CVE-2010-3067 kernel: do_io_submit() infoleak
Summary: CVE-2010-3067 kernel: do_io_submit() infoleak
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2010-3067
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
low
low
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Red Hat Product Security
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard: impact=low,reported=20100902,public=2...
Keywords: Security
Depends On: 629444 629445 629446 629447 629448 629449 629450 629451
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2010-09-02 01:48 UTC by Eugene Teo (Security Response)
Modified: 2019-02-13 22:29 UTC (History)
18 users (show)

(edit)
Clone Of:
(edit)
Last Closed:


Attachments (Terms of Use)


External Trackers
Tracker ID Priority Status Summary Last Updated
Red Hat Product Errata RHSA-2010:0758 normal SHIPPED_LIVE Important: kernel-rt security and bug fix update 2010-10-08 02:12:02 UTC
Red Hat Product Errata RHSA-2010:0779 normal SHIPPED_LIVE Moderate: kernel security and bug fix update 2010-10-19 18:47:53 UTC
Red Hat Product Errata RHSA-2010:0839 normal SHIPPED_LIVE Moderate: kernel security and bug fix update 2010-11-09 18:06:20 UTC
Red Hat Product Errata RHSA-2011:0007 normal SHIPPED_LIVE Important: kernel security and bug fix update 2011-01-11 19:44:55 UTC

Description Eugene Teo (Security Response) 2010-09-02 01:48:50 UTC
Description of problem:
This doesn't look correct, the io_submit systemcall calls do_io_submit() directly:

SYSCALL_DEFINE3(io_submit, aio_context_t, ctx_id, long, nr,
        struct iocb __user * __user *, iocbpp)
{
    return do_io_submit(ctx_id, nr, iocbpp, 0);
}

do_io_submit only checks if nr < 0, but doesnt check if the access_ok
multiplication will overflow.

long do_io_submit(aio_context_t ctx_id, long nr,
          struct iocb __user *__user *iocbpp, bool compat)
{
...
    if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(*iocbpp)))))
        return -EFAULT;
...

Then it uses this loop with __get_user_nocheck(), which doesn't look safe.

...
    for (i=0; i<nr; i++) {
        struct iocb __user *user_iocb;
        struct iocb tmp;

        if (unlikely(__get_user(user_iocb, iocbpp + i))) {
            ret = -EFAULT;
            break;
        }
...

Acknowledgements:

Red Hat would like to thank Tavis Ormandy for reporting this issue.

Comment 8 errata-xmlrpc 2010-10-08 02:12:29 UTC
This issue has been addressed in following products:

  MRG for RHEL-5

Via RHSA-2010:0758 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2010-0758.html

Comment 11 errata-xmlrpc 2010-10-19 18:48:08 UTC
This issue has been addressed in following products:

  Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4

Via RHSA-2010:0779 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2010-0779.html

Comment 12 errata-xmlrpc 2010-11-09 18:06:43 UTC
This issue has been addressed in following products:

  Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5

Via RHSA-2010:0839 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2010-0839.html

Comment 13 errata-xmlrpc 2011-01-11 19:46:01 UTC
This issue has been addressed in following products:

  Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6

Via RHSA-2011:0007 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2011-0007.html


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