Bug 644596 (CVE-2010-4001) - CVE-2010-4001 gromacs: insecure library loading vulnerability
Summary: CVE-2010-4001 gromacs: insecure library loading vulnerability
Status: CLOSED UPSTREAM
Alias: CVE-2010-4001
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
low
low
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Red Hat Product Security
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard: public=20100929,reported=20100929,sou...
Keywords: Security
Depends On: 644950
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2010-10-19 20:07 UTC by Vincent Danen
Modified: 2019-06-10 10:57 UTC (History)
2 users (show)

(edit)
Clone Of:
(edit)
Last Closed: 2019-06-10 10:57:22 UTC


Attachments (Terms of Use)

Description Vincent Danen 2010-10-19 20:07:41 UTC
Ludwig Nussel discovered that gromacs contained a script that could be abused by an attacker to execute arbitrary code.

The vulnerability is due to an insecure change to LD_LIBRARY_PATH, and environment variable used by ld.so(8) to look for libraries in directories other than the standard paths.  When there is an empty item in the colon-separated list of directories in LD_LIBRARY_PATH, ld.so(8) treats it as a '.' (current working directory).  If the given script is executed from a directory where a local attacker could write files, there is a chance for exploitation.

In Fedora, /usr/bin/GMXRC.bash re-sets LD_LIBRARY_PATH insecurely:

tmppath=""
for i in `echo $LD_LIBRARY_PATH | sed "s/:/ /g"`; do
  if test "$i" != "$GMXLDLIB"; then
    tmppath=${tmppath}:$i
  fi
done
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$tmppath

One solution would be to do some shell monkey work (probably something easier but I can't think of it at the moment) like this:

tmppath=""
count=0
for i in `echo $LD_LIBRARY_PATH | sed "s/:/ /g"`; do 
    if test "$i" != "$GMXLDLIB"; then
        if [ ${count} == 0 ]; then
            tmppath=$i
        else
            tmppath=${tmppath}:$i
            count=1
        fi 
    fi 
done

That will avoid prefixing LD_LIBRARY_PATH with ":" if it's set.

Comment 1 Vincent Danen 2010-10-20 16:28:43 UTC
Created gromacs tracking bugs for this issue

Affects: fedora-all [bug 644950]

Comment 2 Vincent Danen 2010-11-09 22:38:41 UTC
MITRE has disputed this with the following note:

"NOTE: CVE disputes this issue because the GMXLDLIB value is always added to the beginning of LD_LIBRARY_PATH at a later point in the script."

This can be seen in the script:

61 # NB: The variables already begin with ':' now, or are empty
62 LD_LIBRARY_PATH=${GMXLDLIB}${LD_LIBRARY_PATH}

Seems like a strange way to handle things, but doesn't introduce any insecurities.  In fact, if nothing else, it does introduce a bug.

Using a slight variation of the script:

 cat 1
#!/bin/sh
tmppath=""
GMXLDLIB="/usr/lib"
for i in `echo $LD_LIBRARY_PATH | sed "s/:/ /g"`; do
  if test "$i" != "$GMXLDLIB"; then
    if test "${tmppath}" == ""; then
      tmppath=$i
    else
    tmppath=${tmppath}:$i
  fi
  fi
done
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$tmppath

LD_LIBRARY_PATH=${GMXLDLIB}${LD_LIBRARY_PATH}

echo ${LD_LIBRARY_PATH}%                                                                                                                                                                                % sh 1                                     
/usr/lib
% LD_LIBRARY_PATH="" sh 1    
/usr/lib
% LD_LIBRARY_PATH="/foo" sh 1
/usr/lib/foo
% LD_LIBRARY_PATH="/foo:/usr/lib:/bar" sh 1
/usr/lib/foo:/bar

But that isn't a security issue as GMXLDLIB always gets prefixed, but the path string gets munged badly.  Probably better to have this in there instead:

if [ -z ${LD_LIBRARY_PATH} ]; then
    LD_LIBRARY_PATH=${GMXLDLIB}
else
    LD_LIBRARY_PATH=${GMXLDLIB}:${LD_LIBRARY_PATH}
fi


At any rate, I do agree with MITRE's assessment that this is not a security issue.

Comment 3 Christoph Junghans 2018-04-11 20:25:46 UTC
This has been fixed in 2016.1-2:

* Fri Dec 23 2016 Christoph Junghans <junghans@votca.org> - 2016.1-2
- drop dangerous GMXRC* - not needed when installed in /usr

Comment 4 Product Security DevOps Team 2019-06-10 10:57:22 UTC
This CVE Bugzilla entry is for community support informational purposes only as it does not affect a package in a commercially supported Red Hat product. Refer to the dependent bugs for status of those individual community products.


Note You need to log in before you can comment on or make changes to this bug.