Bug 649614 - kernel: sys_semctl: fix kernel stack leakage
Summary: kernel: sys_semctl: fix kernel stack leakage
Keywords:
Status: CLOSED DUPLICATE of bug 648673
Alias: None
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
low
low
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Red Hat Product Security
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On: 648721 648793 649616 649617 649618 649619 649620 649621 649622
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2010-11-04 06:30 UTC by Eugene Teo (Security Response)
Modified: 2021-02-24 17:07 UTC (History)
17 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
Doc Type: Bug Fix
Doc Text:
Clone Of:
Environment:
Last Closed: 2010-11-04 07:29:22 UTC
Embargoed:


Attachments (Terms of Use)

Description Eugene Teo (Security Response) 2010-11-04 06:30:11 UTC
The semctl syscall has several code paths that lead to the leakage of
uninitialized kernel stack memory (namely the IPC_INFO, SEM_INFO,
IPC_STAT, and SEM_STAT commands) during the use of the older, obsolete
version of the semid_ds struct.

The copy_semid_to_user() function declares a semid_ds struct on the stack
and copies it back to the user without initializing or zeroing the
"sem_base", "sem_pending", "sem_pending_last", and "undo" pointers,
allowing the leakage of 16 bytes of kernel stack memory.

The code is still reachable on 32-bit systems - when calling semctl()
newer glibc's automatically OR the IPC command with the IPC_64 flag, but
invoking the syscall directly allows users to use the older versions of
the struct.

Upstream commit:
http://git.kernel.org/linus/982f7c2b2e6a28f8f266e075d92e19c0dd4c6e56

Acknowledgements:

Red Hat would like to thank Dan Rosenberg for reporting this issue.

Comment 3 Kurt Seifried 2010-11-04 07:00:16 UTC
Duplicate? https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=648673

Comment 4 Eugene Teo (Security Response) 2010-11-04 07:28:20 UTC
(In reply to comment #3)
> Duplicate? https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=648673

Thanks. Lots of infoleak bugs lately.

Comment 5 Eugene Teo (Security Response) 2010-11-04 07:29:22 UTC

*** This bug has been marked as a duplicate of bug 648673 ***


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