Let's disassemble selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds() and see where we panicked:

crash> dis -r ffffffff8012e13f
0xffffffff8012e092 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds>:     push   %r15
0xffffffff8012e094 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+2>:   push   %r14
0xffffffff8012e096 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+4>:   push   %r13
0xffffffff8012e098 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+6>:   push   %r12
0xffffffff8012e09a <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+8>:   push   %rbp
0xffffffff8012e09b <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+9>:   push   %rbx
0xffffffff8012e09c <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+10>:  sub    $0x98,%rsp
0xffffffff8012e0a3 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+17>:  mov    %gs:0x0,%rax
0xffffffff8012e0ac <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+26>:  mov    0x620(%rax),%r15
0xffffffff8012e0b3 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+33>:  mov    0x1b8(%rdi),%rax
0xffffffff8012e0ba <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+40>:  cmpb   $0x0,0xd(%rax)
0xffffffff8012e0be <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+44>:  je     0xffffffff8012e0d8 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+70>
0xffffffff8012e0c0 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+46>:  mov    %gs:0x0,%rsi
0xffffffff8012e0c9 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+55>:  mov    $0x9,%edi
0xffffffff8012e0ce <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+60>:  callq  0xffffffff80099f9d <force_sig_specific>
0xffffffff8012e0d3 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+65>:  jmpq   0xffffffff8012e4c0 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+1070>
0xffffffff8012e0d8 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+70>:  mov    0x8(%r15),%eax
0xffffffff8012e0dc <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+74>:  cmp    0xc(%r15),%eax
0xffffffff8012e0e0 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+78>:  je     0xffffffff8012e4c0 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+1070>
0xffffffff8012e0e6 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+84>:  mov    %gs:0x0,%rax
0xffffffff8012e0ef <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+93>:  mov    0x598(%rax),%rax
0xffffffff8012e0f6 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+100>: mov    $0xffffffff803328c0,%rdi
0xffffffff8012e0fd <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+107>: mov    %rax,0x18(%rsp)
0xffffffff8012e102 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+112>: callq  0xffffffff80063af8 <mutex_lock>
0xffffffff8012e107 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+117>: mov    %gs:0x0,%rax
0xffffffff8012e110 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+126>: mov    0x5a8(%rax),%rax
0xffffffff8012e117 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+133>: mov    0xe0(%rax),%rbx
0xffffffff8012e11e <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+140>: test   %rbx,%rbx
0xffffffff8012e121 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+143>: je     0xffffffff8012e19b <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+265>
0xffffffff8012e123 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+145>: mov    $0xffffffff803f1300,%rdi
0xffffffff8012e12a <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+152>: callq  0xffffffff80064a85 <_spin_lock>
0xffffffff8012e12f <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+157>: mov    0x290(%rbx),%rax
0xffffffff8012e136 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+164>: test   %rax,%rax
0xffffffff8012e139 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+167>: je     0xffffffff8012e191 <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+255>
0xffffffff8012e13b <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+169>: mov    0x10(%rax),%rax
0xffffffff8012e13f <selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds+173>: mov    0x10(%rax),%rsi

%rax holds a bad pointer - it's 0x0001001000000000 which is clearly not a valid pointer.

The assembly code above actually corresponds to this function which has been inlined:

static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
{
	struct avc_audit_data ad;
	struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
	struct tty_struct *tty;
	struct fdtable *fdt;
	long j = -1;

	mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
	tty = current->signal->tty;
	if (tty) {
		file_list_lock();
		file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
		if (file) {
			/* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
			   Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
			   than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
			   file may belong to another process and we are only
			   interested in the inode-based check here. */
			struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
...

The last two instructions were dereferencing f_dentry and then d_inode but f_dentry had the bad value.

The 'tty' object is still in %rbx and we add 0x290 to get the address of the tty_files field:

crash> px 0xffff811073287000+0x290
$3 = 0xffff811073287290

And then dereference it to get it's value:

crash> rd -64 0xffff811073287290
ffff811073287290:  ffff811073287290                    .r(s....

Well that's interesting - it points to itself.  This indicates the list is empty and we should not be trying to process the list entry.

So what happens is the list head is interpreted as a file pointer and we get garbage:

crash> file 0xffff811073287290
struct file {
  f_u = {
    fu_list = {
      next = 0xffff811073287290, 
      prev = 0xffff811073287290
    }, 
    fu_rcuhead = {
      next = 0xffff811073287290, 
      func = 0xffff811073287290
    }
  }, 
  f_dentry = 0x1001000000000,   <---- bad value that causes the panic.
  f_vfsmnt = 0x10006d4d8, 
  f_op = 0x0, 
  f_count = {
    counter = 351151128
  }, 
  f_flags = 0, 
  f_mode = 0, 
  f_pos = 0, 
  f_owner = {
    lock = {
      raw_lock = {
        lock = 0
      }
    }, 
    pid = 0, 
    uid = 1535176704, 
    euid = 4294934800, 
    security = 0x0, 
    signum = 0
  }, 
  f_uid = 0, 
  f_gid = 0, 
  f_ra = {
    start = 0, 
    size = 0, 
    flags = 0, 
    cache_hit = 0, 
    prev_page = 0, 
    ahead_start = 0, 
    ahead_size = 0, 
    ra_pages = 0, 
    mmap_hit = 0, 
    mmap_miss = 0
  }, 
  f_version = 0, 
  f_security = 0x0, 
  private_data = 0x0, 
  f_ep_links = {
    next = 0x0, 
    prev = 0x0
  }, 
  f_ep_lock = {
    raw_lock = {
      slock = 0
    }
  }, 
  f_mapping = 0x0
}

I think the quick fix here is to add a list_empty(tty->tty_files) check inside the file_list_lock().  The real question is why we've lost the controlling tty.

Upstream commit to fix this issue:

commit 37dd0bd04a3240d2922786d501e2f12cec858fbf
Author: Eric Paris <eparis>
Date:   Fri Oct 31 17:40:00 2008 -0400

    SELinux: properly handle empty tty_files list
    
    SELinux has wrongly (since 2004) had an incorrect test for an empty
    tty->tty_files list.  With an empty list selinux would be pointing to part
    of the tty struct itself and would then proceed to dereference that value
    and again dereference that result.  An F10 change to plymouth on a ppc64
    system is actually currently triggering this bug.  This patch uses
    list_empty() to handle empty lists rather than looking at a meaningless
    location.
    
    [note, this fixes the oops reported in
    https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=469079]
    
    Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis>
    Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris>

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 3e3fde7..f85597a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2126,14 +2126,16 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
        tty = get_current_tty();
        if (tty) {
                file_list_lock();
-               file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
-               if (file) {
+               if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
+                       struct inode *inode;
+
                        /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
                           Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
                           than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
                           file may belong to another process and we are only
                           interested in the inode-based check here. */
-                       struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+                       file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
+                       inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
                        if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
                                           FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
                                drop_tty = 1;

Created attachment 476312 [details]
Patch to check for empty tty_files list

This request was evaluated by Red Hat Product Management for inclusion in a Red
Hat Enterprise Linux maintenance release.  Product Management has requested
further review of this request by Red Hat Engineering, for potential
inclusion in a Red Hat Enterprise Linux Update release for currently deployed
products.  This request is not yet committed for inclusion in an Update
release.

Can anyone describe how to reproduce this?

in kernel-2.6.18-245.el5
You can download this test kernel (or newer) from http://people.redhat.com/jwilson/el5

Detailed testing feedback is always welcomed.

An advisory has been issued which should help the problem
described in this bug report. This report is therefore being
closed with a resolution of ERRATA. For more information
on therefore solution and/or where to find the updated files,
please follow the link below. You may reopen this bug report
if the solution does not work for you.

http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2011-1065.html