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Miredo, a ipv6 over ipv4 tunnel tool is running without being confined. So here is a policy file for it. That's my first policy, and while I tested it ( and the tunnel is working ), that's also the first policy I wrote, based on various internet documentation. So some stuff could likely be missing ( like some interfaces ), or the policy could be overengineered, or too fragile, so I would welcome feedback on it. I tested on fedora 15, just installed miredo-client, started it, and tried to ping ipv6 enabled web site ( www.free.fr , in this case ). There is no message in /var/log/audit/audit.log, and everything work fine.
Created attachment 518336 [details] Type enforcement policy for miredo
Created attachment 518337 [details] interface for miredo policy
Created attachment 518338 [details] File context for miredo policy
require { type tun_tap_device_t; type random_device_t; type sysctl_kernel_t; type proc_net_t; type shell_exec_t; type bin_t; type ifconfig_exec_t; type proc_t; } Should never be used within a te file, that is being submitted for upstream use. You need to use interfaces. audit2allow -R Is helpful in finding interfaces that match the AVC's that you were seeing.
# for executing client_hook with bash # should we use corecmd_exec_shell ? allow miredo_helper_t shell_exec_t:file { read execute open }; allow miredo_helper_t bin_t:lnk_file read; Should be corecmd_exec_shell(miredo_helper_t) allow miredo_client_hook_t proc_t:file { read open getattr }; kernel_read_system_state(miredo_client_hook_t) allow miredo_t random_device_t:chr_file { read open }; dev_read_random(miredo_t) # miredo read ngroups_max and others files for changing dropping privileges allow miredo_t sysctl_kernel_t:file { read open }; allow miredo_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir search; Does miredo ever write to these devices? kernel_rw_kernel_sysctl(miredo_t) allow miredo_t proc_t:file read; kernel_read_system_state(miredo_t) allow miredo_t proc_net_t:file read; kernel_read_network_state(miredo_t) Interface definitions are stored in /usr/share/selinux/devel/include/...
I do not understand the comment #4, audit2allow tell me to use the various types with requires : # grep 1313436933.639:702307 /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -R require { type ifconfig_t; type miredo_client_hook_t; class process { siginh noatsecure rlimitinh }; } #============= miredo_client_hook_t ============== #!!!! This avc has a dontaudit rule in the current policy allow miredo_client_hook_t ifconfig_t:process { siginh rlimitinh noatsecure }; But i see the point about using interfaces, that's indeed clearer. There is lots of them, and it was not obvious at first sight which one would be useful. I will correct this and upload a new version of the .te file later after testing.
Are you running with dontaudit disabled. semodule -B will turn them back on and these AVC's will dissappear.
Yes, the avc was just here to act as a example. I disabled dontaudit to catch some avc that were silently ignored Trying to apply what you told me, I face a problem : + make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile Compiling targeted miredo module /usr/bin/checkmodule: loading policy configuration from tmp/miredo.tmp miredo.te":87:ERROR 'syntax error' at token 'dev_read_random' on line 13776: dev_read_random(miredo_t) And a quick search show that dev_read_random do not seems to exist on f15. Regarding writing to /proc, I found by reading code that miredo write 0 to /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/teredo/accept_redirects , and I didn't catched it with my tests. However, it also fail silently ( and yet open a potential security problem with icmp redirect ). So read write access should be added to file with the sysctl_net_t , I assume that kernel_rw_net_sysctls is the proper interface.
Ok, so the missing interface is dev_read_urand . I removed all requires in the .te, and I will test and upload the new version for comment.
Created attachment 518520 [details] Type enforcement policy for miredo Newer version of the type enforcement policy
Created attachment 519237 [details] miredo.te patch I made some fixes and attached the patch for your .te file.
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