This bug is created as a clone of upstream ticket:
https://fedorahosted.org/389/ticket/110

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=458187

{{{
Description of problem:

The Directory Manager account (the one whose DN is specified in dse.ldif as
nsslapd-rootdn) is a dangerously privileged account.

Access control does not apply to this user and compromising its DN and password
gives full control over the directory server.

Therefore, it would be desirable to limit this user's bind access based on some
additional criteria, in addition to the knowledge of the password.

Limits based on the source host (e.g. localhost) and/or time of day (e.g. only
work hours) would be very useful.

Currently an attacker can easily mount a brute force guessing attack on the
Directory Manager account over the network and if he succeeds, he practically
has full control over the directory server. The only defense against this is by
using a very long manager password and hard to guess rootdn which may be
somewhat unpractical.

This problem is especially significant for LDAP servers accessible from public
networks.

Additional info:

Note that in OpenLDAP this is possible using the following ACL:

access to dn.base="cn=Manager,o=Example"
 by peername.regex=127\.0\.0\.1 auth
 by users none
 by anonymous none


This ACL however requires creating a concrete LDAP entry that corresponds to
rootdn, setting a userPassword in taht entry, and leaving the rootpw in
OpenLDAP configuration undefined. This way the concrete userPassword is used
when binding and is subject to that ACL which only allows access from
connections that origin from 127.0.0.1.

More details:
http://www.openldap.org/faq/data/cache/761.html
http://www.openldap.org/lists/openldap-software/200711/msg00342.html
}}}