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http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2013-1598.html
Description of problem: When unconfined and unlabelednet modules are disabled, running automated test of lvmetad FAILs and causes AVCs. AVCs caused by test in permissive mode is listed below. The test PASSed with no AVCs with both mentioned modules enabled. pand daemon is part of bluez-compat package. ---- time->Thu Sep 6 13:50:42 2012 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1346932242.517:501): arch=c000003e syscall=41 success=no exit=-13 a0=1f a1=3 a2=4 a3=7fff322addb0 items=0 ppid=25800 pid=25801 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=7 comm="pand" exe="/usr/bin/pand" subj=unconfined_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 key=(null) type=AVC msg=audit(1346932242.517:501): avc: denied { create } for pid=25801 comm="pand" scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tclass=socket ---- time->Thu Sep 6 13:50:43 2012 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1346932243.871:502): arch=c000003e syscall=41 success=no exit=-13 a0=1f a1=3 a2=4 a3=7fffb306e170 items=0 ppid=25835 pid=25838 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=7 comm="pand" exe="/usr/bin/pand" subj=unconfined_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 key=(null) type=AVC msg=audit(1346932243.871:502): avc: denied { create } for pid=25838 comm="pand" scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tclass=socket ---- time->Thu Sep 6 13:50:43 2012 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1346932243.914:503): arch=c000003e syscall=41 success=no exit=-13 a0=1f a1=3 a2=4 a3=7fff920739b0 items=0 ppid=25845 pid=25846 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=7 comm="pand" exe="/usr/bin/pand" subj=unconfined_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 key=(null) type=AVC msg=audit(1346932243.914:503): avc: denied { create } for pid=25846 comm="pand" scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tclass=socket ---- time->Thu Sep 6 13:50:45 2012 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1346932245.133:504): arch=c000003e syscall=41 success=no exit=-13 a0=1f a1=3 a2=4 a3=7fffb6fb1970 items=0 ppid=25898 pid=25901 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=7 comm="pand" exe="/usr/bin/pand" subj=unconfined_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 key=(null) type=AVC msg=audit(1346932245.133:504): avc: denied { create } for pid=25901 comm="pand" scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tclass=socket Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable): bluez-compat-4.66-1.el6.x86_64 selinux-policy-3.7.19-155.el6_3.noarch selinux-policy-targeted-3.7.19-155.el6_3.noarch selinux-policy-mls-3.7.19-155.el6_3.noarch How reproducible: always Steps to Reproduce: 1. semodule -d unconfined; semodule -d unlabelednet 2. Run following automated test /CoreOS/selinux-policy/Regression/bz708604-bluetooth-and-similar Actual results: AVCs and pand service cannot be started with error message "Starting pand: Failed to open control socket: Permission denied" Expected results: No AVCs and pand service can be started