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Prior to this update, the GnuPG encryption and signing tool, gpg2, by default used CAST5, an encryption algorithm not approved by FIPS standards. Consequently, when gpg2 was run in FIPS mode, data encryption and decryption failed and caused gpg2 to terminate unexpectedly. With this update, GnuPG uses AES, a FIPS-approved encryption algorithm, and gpg2 data encryption and decryption in FIPS mode work as intended.
In FIPS mode:
$ gpg2 -c -o foo
Ohhhh jeeee: cipher 3 not found
fatal error in libgcrypt, file misc.c, line 139, function _gcry_logv: internal error (fatal or bug)
Neúspěšně ukončen (SIGABRT)
the default cipher seems to be CAST5, which is prohibited. Perhaps gpg could automatically fall back to FIPS-approved cipher algorithms?
As a workaround, it is possible manually specify --cipher-algo AES. ; however, even in that case decryption unnecessarily(?) complains
> DBG: md_enable: algorithm 3 not available
Decryption of CAST5-encrypted data fails similarly:
$ gpg2 --decrypt foo
gpg: zašifrováno neznámým algoritmem 3
Ohhhh jeeee: cipher 3 not found
fatal error in libgcrypt, file misc.c, line 139, function _gcry_logv: internal error (fatal or bug)
Neúspěšně ukončen (SIGABRT) (core dumped [obraz paměti uložen])
I don't want to diverge from upstream more than necessary. So I agree that the default in FIPS mode should be changed to cipher allowed in the FIPS mode. But I am hesitant to change the abort if the user explicitly asks for CAST5.
Successfully verified.
Old (gnupg2-2.0.19-4.el7):
# gpg2 -c -o test
gpg: Ohhhh jeeee: ... this is a bug (passphrase.c:118:hash_passphrase)
Aborted
New (gnupg2-2.0.20-1.el7):
# gpg2 -c -o test
test
This request was resolved in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.0.
Contact your manager or support representative in case you have further questions about the request.
In FIPS mode: $ gpg2 -c -o foo Ohhhh jeeee: cipher 3 not found fatal error in libgcrypt, file misc.c, line 139, function _gcry_logv: internal error (fatal or bug) Neúspěšně ukončen (SIGABRT) the default cipher seems to be CAST5, which is prohibited. Perhaps gpg could automatically fall back to FIPS-approved cipher algorithms? As a workaround, it is possible manually specify --cipher-algo AES. ; however, even in that case decryption unnecessarily(?) complains > DBG: md_enable: algorithm 3 not available