Bug 2577154 (CVE-2026-133228) - CVE-2026-133228 org.keycloak.services.resources: Client minimum ACR (level of authentication) is not enforced when the login starts at the credential reset endpoint, allowing a second factor bypass
Summary: CVE-2026-133228 org.keycloak.services.resources: Client minimum ACR (level of...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-133228
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
medium
medium
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security DevOps Team
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-11-19 18:10 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-11-19 18:18 UTC (History)
10 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
Clone Of:
Environment:
Last Closed:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 18:10:31 UTC
A client can enforce a minimum authentication level (the "Minimum ACR

Value" client setting, documented as the server-side way to enforce
step-up authentication). The normal authorization endpoint applies
that minimum, so the second factor is demanded. The credential reset
endpoint (/realms/{realm}/login-actions/reset-credentials?client_id=...&redirect_uri=...)
also creates a login session for a client. That session never receives
the client's required level. A user who starts the login there and
follows the "Back to login" link gets the same login form. Because no
level is required, the conditional second-factor subflow is skipped
and the login completes with the first factor only. Keycloak then
issues an authorization code, and the client can redeem it for an
access token and a refresh token. The token carries the level the
first factor reached (acr=1).

The same defect was fixed for the Device Authorization Grant and CIBA
in 26.8.2 (CVE-2026-105305). This is a further entry point with the
same missing step. The same omission exists when a login is continued
from an action token link (password reset, verify email or
execute-actions email), but that path needs a valid action token and
is narrower.

Against the built-in administration console, whose minimum ACR is set
to a second-factor level, an attacker who knows only an
administrator's password obtains a token that works against the Admin
API. This also relies on the missing PKCE enforcement at the token
endpoint on the same entry point, which is tracked separately in
keycloak/keycloak#55064.


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