Bug 2492015 (CVE-2026-54512) - CVE-2026-54512 jackson-databind: jackson-databind: Arbitrary code execution via PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass
Summary: CVE-2026-54512 jackson-databind: jackson-databind: Arbitrary code execution v...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-54512
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
high
high
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security DevOps Team
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On: 2495203 2495204 2495205 2495206 2495207 2495208 2495209 2495210 2495211 2495212 2495213
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-06-23 22:02 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-07-08 18:28 UTC (History)
137 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
Clone Of:
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System ID Private Priority Status Summary Last Updated
Red Hat Product Errata RHSA-2026:36839 0 None None None 2026-07-08 18:28:44 UTC

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-06-23 22:02:12 UTC
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV. If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization. An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.

Comment 2 Abhishek Raj 2026-07-03 09:02:52 UTC Comment hidden (spam)
Comment 3 errata-xmlrpc 2026-07-08 18:28:37 UTC
This issue has been addressed in the following products:

  Red Hat Build of Apache Camel 4.18 for Quarkus 3.33

Via RHSA-2026:36839 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:36839


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