Bug 2577154 (CVE-2026-133228)

Summary: CVE-2026-133228 org.keycloak.services.resources: Client minimum ACR (level of authentication) is not enforced when the login starts at the credential reset endpoint, allowing a second factor bypass
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: aschwart, aszczucz, boliveir, drichtar, mposolda, pjindal, rmartinc, ssilvert, sthorger, vmuzikar
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in Keycloak. When a client application enforces step-up authentication or multi-factor authentication (MFA) via a minimum authentication level, Keycloak fails to apply this requirement to login sessions initiated through the credential reset endpoint. An attacker who possesses a user's initial credentials (such as a password) can navigate from the reset interface back to the standard login form and authenticate without completing the required second factor. This flaw allows an attacker to obtain valid access tokens and gain unauthorized access to protected services without satisfying mandatory security controls.
Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 18:10:31 UTC
A client can enforce a minimum authentication level (the "Minimum ACR

Value" client setting, documented as the server-side way to enforce
step-up authentication). The normal authorization endpoint applies
that minimum, so the second factor is demanded. The credential reset
endpoint (/realms/{realm}/login-actions/reset-credentials?client_id=...&redirect_uri=...)
also creates a login session for a client. That session never receives
the client's required level. A user who starts the login there and
follows the "Back to login" link gets the same login form. Because no
level is required, the conditional second-factor subflow is skipped
and the login completes with the first factor only. Keycloak then
issues an authorization code, and the client can redeem it for an
access token and a refresh token. The token carries the level the
first factor reached (acr=1).

The same defect was fixed for the Device Authorization Grant and CIBA
in 26.8.2 (CVE-2026-105305). This is a further entry point with the
same missing step. The same omission exists when a login is continued
from an action token link (password reset, verify email or
execute-actions email), but that path needs a valid action token and
is narrower.

Against the built-in administration console, whose minimum ACR is set
to a second-factor level, an attacker who knows only an
administrator's password obtains a token that works against the Admin
API. This also relies on the missing PKCE enforcement at the token
endpoint on the same entry point, which is tracked separately in
keycloak/keycloak#55064.