Bug 2577154 (CVE-2026-133228)
| Summary: | CVE-2026-133228 org.keycloak.services.resources: Client minimum ACR (level of authentication) is not enforced when the login starts at the credential reset endpoint, allowing a second factor bypass | ||
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| Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport> |
| Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev> |
| Status: | NEW --- | QA Contact: | |
| Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | medium | ||
| Version: | unspecified | CC: | aschwart, aszczucz, boliveir, drichtar, mposolda, pjindal, rmartinc, ssilvert, sthorger, vmuzikar |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | --- | |
| Doc Text: |
A flaw was found in Keycloak. When a client application enforces step-up authentication or multi-factor authentication (MFA) via a minimum authentication level, Keycloak fails to apply this requirement to login sessions initiated through the credential reset endpoint. An attacker who possesses a user's initial credentials (such as a password) can navigate from the reset interface back to the standard login form and authenticate without completing the required second factor. This flaw allows an attacker to obtain valid access tokens and gain unauthorized access to protected services without satisfying mandatory security controls.
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Story Points: | --- |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | Type: | --- | |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
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A client can enforce a minimum authentication level (the "Minimum ACR Value" client setting, documented as the server-side way to enforce step-up authentication). The normal authorization endpoint applies that minimum, so the second factor is demanded. The credential reset endpoint (/realms/{realm}/login-actions/reset-credentials?client_id=...&redirect_uri=...) also creates a login session for a client. That session never receives the client's required level. A user who starts the login there and follows the "Back to login" link gets the same login form. Because no level is required, the conditional second-factor subflow is skipped and the login completes with the first factor only. Keycloak then issues an authorization code, and the client can redeem it for an access token and a refresh token. The token carries the level the first factor reached (acr=1). The same defect was fixed for the Device Authorization Grant and CIBA in 26.8.2 (CVE-2026-105305). This is a further entry point with the same missing step. The same omission exists when a login is continued from an action token link (password reset, verify email or execute-actions email), but that path needs a valid action token and is narrower. Against the built-in administration console, whose minimum ACR is set to a second-factor level, an attacker who knows only an administrator's password obtains a token that works against the Admin API. This also relies on the missing PKCE enforcement at the token endpoint on the same entry point, which is tracked separately in keycloak/keycloak#55064.