When server receives a list of signature algorithms that are unrecognised to it, it replies with a decode_error alert instead of handshake_failure alert.

This is a regression compared to Bug #1410573 and RFC 5246 violation.

+++ This bug was initially created as a clone of Bug #1410573 +++

Description of problem:
When Client Hello received by server does not include algorithms known to server, the server signs Server Key Exchange with a sha1+rsa signature algorithm.

Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):
nss-3.21.0-17.el7.x86_64

How reproducible:
always

Steps to Reproduce:
1. Send Client Hello with invalid values in signature_algorithms extension

Actual results:
Server replies with a SKE message signed with SHA-1

Expected results:
handshake_failure alert message

Additional info:
This is RFC 5246 violation:

   If the client does not support the default algorithms (...),
   it MUST send the
   signature_algorithms extension, listing the algorithms it is willing
   to accept.

("default algorithms" refers to sha1+rsa, sha1+dsa and sha1+ecdsa pairs)

   If the client has offered the "signature_algorithms" extension, the
   signature algorithm and hash algorithm MUST be a pair listed in that
   extension.  Note that there is a possibility for inconsistencies
   here.  For instance, the client might offer DHE_DSS key exchange but
   omit any DSA pairs from its "signature_algorithms" extension.  In
   order to negotiate correctly, the server MUST check any candidate
   cipher suites against the "signature_algorithms" extension before
   selecting them.  This is somewhat inelegant but is a compromise
   designed to minimize changes to the original cipher suite design.