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Bug 1691484 - Stop of cluster with enabled sbd leads sometimes to fence of the cluster nodes (re-check order of stopping cluster daemons)
Summary: Stop of cluster with enabled sbd leads sometimes to fence of the cluster node...
Keywords:
Status: CLOSED ERRATA
Alias: None
Product: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7
Classification: Red Hat
Component: sbd
Version: 7.7
Hardware: Unspecified
OS: Unspecified
unspecified
unspecified
Target Milestone: rc
: ---
Assignee: Klaus Wenninger
QA Contact: cluster-qe@redhat.com
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks: 1685222
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2019-03-21 17:47 UTC by Klaus Wenninger
Modified: 2019-08-06 12:47 UTC (History)
7 users (show)

Fixed In Version: sbd-1.4.0-4.el7
Doc Type: If docs needed, set a value
Doc Text:
Clone Of: 1685222
Environment:
Last Closed: 2019-08-06 12:47:40 UTC
Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:


Attachments (Terms of Use)


Links
System ID Private Priority Status Summary Last Updated
Red Hat Product Errata RHBA-2019:2103 0 None None None 2019-08-06 12:47:46 UTC

Description Klaus Wenninger 2019-03-21 17:47:37 UTC
The shortcomings of sbd detecting a pacemaker-shutdown are definitely not pacemaker-2.x specific although shutdown-timing changed there a little which seems to make the undesired behaviour more likely.

+++ This bug was initially created as a clone of Bug #1685222 +++

Description of problem:
Stop of cluster with enabled sbd leads sometimes to fence of the cluster nodes.

Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):
# rpm -q libqb libknet1 sbd corosync pacemaker pcs systemd
libqb-1.0.3-7.el8.x86_64
libknet1-1.4-3.el8.x86_64
sbd-1.3.1-18.el8.x86_64
corosync-3.0.0-2.el8.x86_64
pacemaker-2.0.1-4.el8.x86_64
pcs-0.10.1-4.el8.x86_64
systemd-239-13.el8.x86_64


How reproducible:
difficult

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Create 3-node cluster

# pcs host auth -u hacluster -p $PASSWORD virt-14{1..3}
...
# pcs cluster setup HAcluster virt-14{1..3}
...

2. Enable sbd with watchdog=/dev/null (optionally lower SBD_WATCHDOG_TIMEOUT below 5s)

# pcs stonith sbd enable watchdog=/dev/null --no-watchdog-validation
...


3. Start the cluster

# pcs cluster start --all --wait
...

4. Stop the cluster and watch the logs

# pcs cluster stop --all
...

Actual results:

One or more nodes are rebooted.


Expected results:

No nodes are rebooted during cluster stop.


Additional info:

See attached logs for more info.

$ grep sbd *stop-03.log
virt-141_stop-03.log:Mar  4 17:35:59 virt-141 sbd[7610]: warning: inquisitor_child: Servant pcmk is outdated (age: 4)
virt-141_stop-03.log:Mar  4 17:36:02 virt-141 sbd[7610]: warning: inquisitor_child: Latency: No liveness for 4 s exceeds threshold of 3 s (healthy servants: 0)
virt-141_stop-03.log:Mar  4 17:36:02 virt-141 sbd[7610]: warning: inquisitor_child: Latency: No liveness for 4 s exceeds threshold of 3 s (healthy servants: 0)
virt-141_stop-03.log:Mar  4 17:36:03 virt-141 sbd[7610]: warning: inquisitor_child: Latency: No liveness for 5 s exceeds threshold of 3 s (healthy servants: 0)
virt-142_stop-03.log:Mar  4 17:35:59 virt-142 sbd[15742]: warning: inquisitor_child: Servant pcmk is outdated (age: 4)
virt-142_stop-03.log:Mar  4 17:36:02 virt-142 sbd[15742]: warning: inquisitor_child: Latency: No liveness for 4 s exceeds threshold of 3 s (healthy servants: 0)
virt-142_stop-03.log:Mar  4 17:36:03 virt-142 sbd[15742]: warning: inquisitor_child: Latency: No liveness for 5 s exceeds threshold of 3 s (healthy servants: 0)
virt-142_stop-03.log:Mar  4 17:36:03 virt-142 sbd[15742]: warning: inquisitor_child: Latency: No liveness for 5 s exceeds threshold of 3 s (healthy servants: 0)
virt-143_stop-03.log:Mar  4 17:36:10 virt-143 sbd[15109]: warning: inquisitor_child: Servant pcmk is outdated (age: 4)
virt-143_stop-03.log:Mar  4 17:36:13 virt-143 sbd[15109]: warning: inquisitor_child: Latency: No liveness for 4 s exceeds threshold of 3 s (healthy servants: 0)
virt-143_stop-03.log:Mar  4 17:36:13 virt-143 sbd[15109]: warning: inquisitor_child: Latency: No liveness for 4 s exceeds threshold of 3 s (healthy servants: 0)
virt-143_stop-03.log:Mar  4 17:36:14 virt-143 sbd[15109]: warning: inquisitor_child: Latency: No liveness for 5 s exceeds threshold of 3 s (healthy servants: 0)
virt-143_stop-03.log:Mar  4 17:36:14 virt-143 sbd[15109]: warning: inquisitor_child: Latency: No liveness for 5 s exceeds threshold of 3 s (healthy servants: 0)

--- Additional comment from Klaus Wenninger on 2019-03-05 08:43:26 UTC ---

Hmm ... that may be a non-trivial issue.
We probably can assume that start of shutdown of all pacemaker-instances will be synchronous enough.
But of course we can't assume that all pacemaker-instances will terminate simultaneously.
Actually it is not about the pacemaker-instances but rather about the corosync-instances as
they will make the residual cluster non-quorate at some point which after the configured timeout
will lead to self-fencing.
One way might be disabling sbd-observation somehow in such a shutdown scenario but imagining
what happens if that cluster-shutdown coincides with a cluster-split I would vote against
this approach.
I guess atm pcs tries to bring down the cluster-stack individually on all of the nodes!?
If pcs would first bring down pacemaker on all nodes persisting corosync would preserve
quorum. (This approach might be rethought for corosync-1 based cluster-stack where
quorum is implemented inside pacemaker. Cluster-stacks with cman are of course different
again - but keeping cman running till all pacemaker-instances are gone will probably
do the trick here.) 
If there are then still issues we would have to introduce detection of graceful local
pacemaker shutdown into sbd (which atm - at least as far as I see and remember isn't there)
to bring sbd into the state it had prior to first pacemaker detection.

@Miro:
I remember having seen similar issues in the past randomly.
Do you observe the issue more frequently recently so that we could expect some
kind of regressing here? Maybe just indirectly because of some timing-changes due
to corosync-3 or pacemaker-2 ...

--- Additional comment from Tomas Jelinek on 2019-03-05 09:20:38 UTC ---

(In reply to Klaus Wenninger from comment #1)
> I guess atm pcs tries to bring down the cluster-stack individually on all of
> the nodes!?

No, it does not.

> If pcs would first bring down pacemaker on all nodes persisting corosync
> would preserve
> quorum.

This is what pcs is already doing, see bz1180506.

--- Additional comment from Klaus Wenninger on 2019-03-05 09:59:26 UTC ---

(In reply to Tomas Jelinek from comment #2)

> 
> > If pcs would first bring down pacemaker on all nodes persisting corosync
> > would preserve
> > quorum.
> 
> This is what pcs is already doing, see bz1180506.

Ok matches what we are seeing in the logs around 17:35:55.
Sorry for not having looked close enough.

virt-142 & virt-141 are bringing down pacemaker more or less immediately
while there is no noticable action on the DC (virt-143) between 17:35:55 & 
17:36:04 (corosync detects the 2 peers having rebooted).
Question is what it is doing then ...
Transition 27 is completed 17:35:55 and the next transition-calculation (28)
is triggered by the 2 nodes disappearing at 17:36:08 and is considered
complete right after.
But what is that node doing in between? There is no pending transition ...

But anyway virt-142 & virt-141 should probably detect graceful shutdown
of their local pacemaker-instance and properly reinitialize sbd to
wait for a pacemaker-instance to come up without timeout instead of
timeouting waiting for a connection to the local pacemaker-instance.
Guess there shouldn't be any danger in introducing that behaviour.

--- Additional comment from Miroslav Lisik on 2019-03-05 12:05:38 UTC ---


> @Miro:
> I remember having seen similar issues in the past randomly.
> Do you observe the issue more frequently recently so that we could expect
> some
> kind of regressing here? Maybe just indirectly because of some
> timing-changes due
> to corosync-3 or pacemaker-2 ...

I observe this issue more frequently on rhel 8.0 than rhel7.6. On rhel7.6 with SBD_WATCHDOG_TIMEOUT=2, I get only messages like this:

warning: inquisitor_child: pcmk health check: UNHEALTH
warning: inquisitor_child: Servant pcmk is outdated (age: 356680)

Fence of a node is still reproducible on not powerfull VMs (1CPU, 2GB RAM) with rhel7.6 and SBD_WATCHDOG_TIMEOUT=1.

--- Additional comment from Klaus Wenninger on 2019-03-05 12:17:15 UTC ---

(In reply to Miroslav Lisik from comment #4)
> > @Miro:
> > I remember having seen similar issues in the past randomly.
> > Do you observe the issue more frequently recently so that we could expect
> > some
> > kind of regressing here? Maybe just indirectly because of some
> > timing-changes due
> > to corosync-3 or pacemaker-2 ...
> 
> I observe this issue more frequently on rhel 8.0 than rhel7.6. On rhel7.6
> with SBD_WATCHDOG_TIMEOUT=2, I get only messages like this:
> 
> warning: inquisitor_child: pcmk health check: UNHEALTH
> warning: inquisitor_child: Servant pcmk is outdated (age: 356680)
> 
> Fence of a node is still reproducible on not powerfull VMs (1CPU, 2GB RAM)
> with rhel7.6 and SBD_WATCHDOG_TIMEOUT=1.

On the vm I just tested with I sometimes get
"warning: inquisitor_child: Servant pcmk is outdated (age: 4)".
So I guess 5s is quite on the edge.
Have to have a deeper look into how that disarming is actually working
and what could take that long.

--- Additional comment from Miroslav Lisik on 2019-03-05 12:24:16 UTC ---

Most of the time i also get message with 'age: 4' but sometimes is this number suspiciously high.

--- Additional comment from Ken Gaillot on 2019-03-05 18:09:44 UTC ---

I agree with the idea of sbd having intelligence about a graceful pacemaker shutdown.

Speaking generally, there are many reasons shutdown could take much different times on different nodes, the most obvious being some resources take longer to stop than others. The DC will always wait for all the other nodes to shut down (at least if there are no problems) before shutting down itself.

--- Additional comment from Klaus Wenninger on 2019-03-06 04:15:52 UTC ---

(In reply to Ken Gaillot from comment #7)
> I agree with the idea of sbd having intelligence about a graceful pacemaker
> shutdown.

That is kind of working already but seems to take a few seconds under
certain circumstances. If we want low watchdog-timeouts some research
is required and the detection has to be made more robust.

> 
> Speaking generally, there are many reasons shutdown could take much
> different times on different nodes, the most obvious being some resources
> take longer to stop than others. The DC will always wait for all the other
> nodes to shut down (at least if there are no problems) before shutting down
> itself.

But in this case the nodes are long gone and even the log on the DC shows
that the DC has detected that but it still takes till corosync detects
them to be gone (due to sbd rebooting) for the DC to shut down.
Anyway nothing to rely on that all pacemaker-instances shut down within
watchdog-timeout ... was just curious as I didnt see a reason ...

--- Additional comment from Ken Gaillot on 2019-03-06 15:03:47 UTC ---

(In reply to Klaus Wenninger from comment #8)
> > Speaking generally, there are many reasons shutdown could take much
> > different times on different nodes, the most obvious being some resources
> > take longer to stop than others. The DC will always wait for all the other
> > nodes to shut down (at least if there are no problems) before shutting down
> > itself.
> 
> But in this case the nodes are long gone and even the log on the DC shows
> that the DC has detected that but it still takes till corosync detects
> them to be gone (due to sbd rebooting) for the DC to shut down.
> Anyway nothing to rely on that all pacemaker-instances shut down within
> watchdog-timeout ... was just curious as I didnt see a reason ...

Shutdown isn't considered complete until a node leaves both the crmd membership and the corosync membership.

--- Additional comment from Klaus Wenninger on 2019-03-06 15:25:12 UTC ---

(In reply to Ken Gaillot from comment #9)

> 
> Shutdown isn't considered complete until a node leaves both the crmd
> membership and the corosync membership.

But isn't what we see here rather the nodes disappearing completely
from corosync as they are rebooted and not their signing of from cpg?

--- Additional comment from Ken Gaillot on 2019-03-06 15:44:48 UTC ---

(In reply to Klaus Wenninger from comment #10)
> (In reply to Ken Gaillot from comment #9)
> 
> > 
> > Shutdown isn't considered complete until a node leaves both the crmd
> > membership and the corosync membership.
> 
> But isn't what we see here rather the nodes disappearing completely
> from corosync as they are rebooted and not their signing of from cpg?

I forgot, shutdown would be considered complete after *either* loss before e7d9622, which I just checked and now realize is in RHEL 8 only.

Comment 6 errata-xmlrpc 2019-08-06 12:47:40 UTC
Since the problem described in this bug report should be
resolved in a recent advisory, it has been closed with a
resolution of ERRATA.

For information on the advisory, and where to find the updated
files, follow the link below.

If the solution does not work for you, open a new bug report.

https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2019:2103


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