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Description of problem:
type=AVC msg=audit(1560791816.356:387178): avc: denied { signull } for pid=22759 comm="rhsmcertd-worke" scontext=system_u:system_r:rhsmcertd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tclass=process permissive=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1560791816.356:387178): arch=x86_64 syscall=kill success=no exit=EACCES a0=5368 a1=0 a2=58e7 a3=0 items=0 ppid=1851 pid=22759 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm=rhsmcertd-worke exe=/usr/bin/python2.7 subj=system_u:system_r:rhsmcertd_t:s0 key=(null)
Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):
selinux-policy-3.13.1-229.el7_6.12.noarch
How reproducible:
Not sure, likely an RHSM internal routine.
Actual results:
SELinux Troubleshoot mail
Expected results:
No SELinux Troubleshoot mail
Additional info:
Quite similar like bug #1379781, bug #1490961, bug #1576555, bug #1588119 or bug #1701338, but not a duplicate.
The real issue beyond is likely that the Red Hat Subscription Manager developers are having a IMHO quite bad development style by sending "random" SIGNULL signals around to figure out whether a process is running (or so) and the SELinux policy maintainers are only adding minimalistic dontaudit rules to the policy for whatever I report (rather than all simply a dontaudit for domains). Any chance to get this really addressed?
Description of problem: type=AVC msg=audit(1560791816.356:387178): avc: denied { signull } for pid=22759 comm="rhsmcertd-worke" scontext=system_u:system_r:rhsmcertd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tclass=process permissive=0 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1560791816.356:387178): arch=x86_64 syscall=kill success=no exit=EACCES a0=5368 a1=0 a2=58e7 a3=0 items=0 ppid=1851 pid=22759 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm=rhsmcertd-worke exe=/usr/bin/python2.7 subj=system_u:system_r:rhsmcertd_t:s0 key=(null) Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable): selinux-policy-3.13.1-229.el7_6.12.noarch How reproducible: Not sure, likely an RHSM internal routine. Actual results: SELinux Troubleshoot mail Expected results: No SELinux Troubleshoot mail Additional info: Quite similar like bug #1379781, bug #1490961, bug #1576555, bug #1588119 or bug #1701338, but not a duplicate. The real issue beyond is likely that the Red Hat Subscription Manager developers are having a IMHO quite bad development style by sending "random" SIGNULL signals around to figure out whether a process is running (or so) and the SELinux policy maintainers are only adding minimalistic dontaudit rules to the policy for whatever I report (rather than all simply a dontaudit for domains). Any chance to get this really addressed?